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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the (distortionary) impact of consumption and produc-
tion externalities on economic growth. In contrast to the existing literature,
this paper considers finitely-lived agents.
Individual demand is conventionally considered to be independent of oth-
ers’ consumption demands. The rate at which the sales-share of sports utility
vehicles (purchased by non-adventurous people) in total car sales increases,
however, casts doubt on this independence. It rather is anecdotal evidence
for the possibility of a negative consumption externality.
There is significant empirical evidence of consumption and production ex-
ternalities. Brekke and Howarth (2002), Frank (1999), Johansson-Stenman
et al. (2002, 2006), Luttmer (2005), and Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005)
present impressive evidence for negative consumption externalities (“keeping
(catching) up with the Jonses” preferences).1 Their consideration in eco-
nomic analysis is important as they allow us to explain data that cannot
be otherwise explained. For example, various papers demonstrate that con-
sideration of consumption externalities help resolve many economic puzzles,
including the equity premium, excess sensitivity, and excess smoothness puz-
zles.
Externalities also have an impact on the growth dynamics. In addition
to investigating the effects of externalities for consumption growth and cap-
ital accumulation, it is of crucial importance to know whether this impact
1Regarding consumption externalities, further important references include Alpizar et
al. (2005), Carlsson et al. (2003), Easterlin (1995), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), McBride
(2001), Neumark et al. (1998). For production externalities, see, e.g., Caballero and Lyons
(1990, 1992), and Lindstrom (2000).
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is distortionary or not. For example, if a negative consumption externality
imposed a distortion, a shift in the tax base towards consumption would
possibly raise efficiency. If the consumption externality had no distortionary
impact, the same tax reform would reduce efficiency. In this paper, we show
that only in a framework with finite horizons, a negative consumption exter-
nality always leads to “overconsumption” (consumption levels higher than
optimal), and to savings rates (growth rates) lower than optimal. This find-
ing helps explaining the very low savings rates seen in many industrialized
countries. As argued below, in the framework of infinitely-lived agent (ILA)
models, consumption externalities either do not introduce a distortion at all,
or they result in “underconsumption,” thereby implying savings and growth
rates higher than optimal.
More specifically, this paper offers a systematic analysis of the effects of
externalities, in the context of a continuous-time overlapping generations (C-
OLG) model with AK technology. The model contains the case of infinite
lifetime as a special case. Therefore, it is possible to relate the results ob-
tained from the C-OLG economy, with a finite horizon, to those of the ILA
economy, with an infinite horizon. The analysis displays three important
results.
First, with a negative consumption externality, the steady state growth
rate in a decentralized economy always falls short from the one in a command
optimum, contrary to the infinitely-lived agent case (where the consumption
externality does not introduce a distortion in the steady state). The reason
is seen to come from overconsumption. Households consume more and save
less than optimal. Consequently consumption growth is lower than optimal.
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Second, growth rates along the transition paths always differ between a de-
centralized economy and the ones in a command optimum. Whether this
difference is positive or negative depends on the nature of the consumption
externality. In particular, we demonstrate that the consumption growth rate
can be larger than optimal for some time, along a transition path, and it can
later become smaller than optimal, close to and in a steady state equilib-
rium. This reversal is never implied by an ILA model. These results hold –
even when there is no production externality, and labor supply is exogenous.
Third, in the ILA model, consumption is equal across agents in equilibrium.
One might ask, whether a consumption externality (such as keeping up with
the Joneses preferences) can appropriately be treated in such a symmetrical
context, as the externality stems from different consumption levels. The C-
OLG model introduces the required heterogeneity. As wealth differs among
cohorts, so do individual consumption levels in equilibrium. Therefore, the
C-OLG framework seems to be a natural framework to consider consumption
externalities.
This work relates to several papers in the literature. Brekke and Howarth
(2002), and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002, 2006) discuss the impact of con-
sumption externalities on consumption choice and growth in some detail. Liu
and Turnovsky (2005) consider consumption and production externalities in
an economy, populated by infinitely-lived households. They show that if
labor supply is inelastic, without a production externality, consumption ex-
ternalities do not introduce a distortion with respect to both the steady state
equilibrium and the transitional dynamics, when the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between individual and aggregate consumption is constant through
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time. Carroll et al. (1997) analyze the effects of consumption externalities
in an endogenous growth model populated with infinitely-lived dynasties. In
their analysis, they show that the steady state growth rates of consumption,
capital and output increase in the consumption externality, that is shown
to raise the long-horizon intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion. Abel (2005) extents these analyses in that he considers the impact of
a consumption externality within the framework of an overlapping genera-
tions economy, where each generation is alive for two periods. He focuses
on optimal fiscal policy and demonstrates that in addition to a lump-sum
tax/transfer scheme (that ensures optimal savings), an additional instrument
is needed for internalizing the consumption externality. In contrast to Abel
(2005), the consumption externality introduces a distortion in the C-OLG
model, even when the social planner’s discount rate equals the market one.2
This paper systematically studies the distortionary impact of externalities
on economic growth in the context of a C-OLG model where households are
finitely-lived. In contrast to the existing ILA literature, the present study
shows that in the finite-horizon case, consumption externalities (alone) are
always distortionary, that is, they introduce an inefficiency. Many studies
show significant evidence for negative consumption externalities (see above).
As one consequence, this paper’s results support arguments in favor of a shift
in the tax base towards consumption, on grounds of efficiency.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents the
economy’s structure of both the market economy framework and a command
optimum. Section 3 first compares the steady state effects of the externalities
2In Abel (2005), benchmarks introduce no distortion, when private and social discount
rates are equal, and benchmarks are equally weighted averages of all consumers.
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between both economies, and then considers the effects of the externalities
on transitional dynamics. Section 4 concludes the paper. The appendix
contains major derivations and proofs, and is found at the end of this paper.
2 The Economy’s Structure
In this section, we extend the continuous time overlapping generations model
by consideration of consumption and production externalities. In light of the
evidence referred to in the introduction, we focus on a negative consumption
externality (“catching up with the Joneses” preferences), and a positive pro-
duction externality, as in Romer (1986).
Population. An individual born at time v (“vintage”) is uncertain about
the length of his or her life. Following the usual perpetual-youth assumption
(Blanchard, 1985), we employ two assumptions. First, the instantaneous
probability of death (the “death rate”), β, is constant and independent of
age. Second, the death rate equals the birth rate. At each instant of time, a
large new cohort of size β P (t) is born, where P (t) is the size of population in
t. Clearly, as the population size is “large,” the number of births and deaths
coincide, and we can normalize population size to unity: P (t) ≡ 1. Under
this simple population structure, at time t, the size of a vintage-v cohort is
β e−β (t−v). Moreover, the expected remaining lifetime of any agent is β−1. As
a special case, the representative-agent model emerges from the continuous
time overlapping generations model as β approaches zero.
Households. Time-t utility of a vintage-v household is a function u(.) of
consumption c(v, t). The first argument in c(.) refers to the birth date, and
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the second argument refers to time. At time t, an individual household,
however, not only cares about its own consumption, but also about how own
consumption compares to some reference consumption level X(t). Therefore,
instantaneous utility is given by u(c(v, t), X(t)).
In this paper, we consider the standard case of a CRRA utility function.
We follow Gal´ı (1994) and Carroll et al. (1997) in specifying the instanta-
neous utility function as:
u(c(v, t), X(t)) =
c(v, t)(1−σ)X(t)−γ(1−σ)
1− σ (1)
=
1
(1− σ)
[
c(v, t)(1−γ)
(
c(v, t)
X(t)
)γ]1−σ
, σ > 1 .
Parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) measures the extent of the consumption externality,
i.e., the importance of the reference stock. Suppose, γ = 0, then the model
reduces to the usual model with interpersonally separable CRRA utility. Pa-
rameter σ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If γ = 0,
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is given by σ−1. If, however,
γ > 0, both, own consumption and the reference stock determine the elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption at any two points in time. As is
overwhelmingly suggested by the empirical literature, σ is considered to be
larger than unity.
At time t, expected lifetime utility of a household born in v is given by
E[U(v, t)] =
∫ ∞
t
u(c(v, τ), X(τ)) e−(ρ+β) (τ−t) dτ , (2)
where ρ is the household’s pure rate of time preference. As in Yaari’s (1965)
analysis, the possibility of death leads to a subjective discount rate (ρ + β)
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higher than the pure rate of time preference.3
Reference Consumption. Aggregate consumption is defined by C(t) ≡
β
∫ t
−∞ e
−β (t−v) c(v, t) dv. As the population size is normalized to unity, C(t)
equals average consumption. The reference consumption stock develops ac-
cording to:
X˙(t) = ϕ (C(t)−X(t)) , X(0) = X0 , (3)
with X0 exogenously given.
4 The reference level X(t) is a weighted average of
past average consumptions. The parameter ϕ ≥ 0 determines the weight of
average consumption at different times. The larger is ϕ, the more important
is average consumption in the recent past. As ϕ→∞, X(t)→ C(t).
Sign Restrictions. With γ ∈ [0, 1), and σ > 1, marginal utility rises in
the reference stock: ucX(.) > 0. In the taxonomy of Dupor and Liu (2003),
preferences exhibit the “keeping (catching) up with the Jonses” property, for
these sign restrictions. Moreover, γ < 1 ensures positivity of marginal utility
of a proportionate increase in both individual consumption and the reference
stock: uc(.) + uX(.) > 0. To keep the economy from explosive growth, we
need to impose the following sign restriction:
σ − γ (σ − 1) > 0 , (4)
which ensures: ucc(.) + ucX(.) < 0. That is, a proportionate increase of both
individual consumption and reference stock has diminishing marginal utility.5
3Observe that the subjective (effective) discount rate, ρ+ β, is essentially independent
of the specification of the utility function.
4Different specifications could potentially be adopted. The proposed specification, how-
ever, is rather general, and there is no empirical evidence supporting an alternative spec-
ification.
5For a CRRA utility function, sign restriction (4) is implied by γ < 1.
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Production. There is a large number of perfectly competitive, identical firms
producing a homogeneous output, Y (t), according to
Y (t) = Z(t)K(t)α L(t)1−α , 0 < α ≤ 1 , (5)
where K(t) is capital, and L(t) are labor services. Total factor productivity,
Z(t), is considered given by individual firms. Firms maximize profits and
hire factors from households on competitive factor markets:
αZ(t)L(t)1−αK(t)−1+α = r(t)+δ , (1−α)Z(t)L(t)−αK(t)α = w(t) , (6)
where r(t) is the rate of interest, w(t) is the wage rate, and δ is the rate of
depreciation of capital.
Factor productivity, Z(t), is given by:
Z(t) = AK(t)1−α , α < 1 . (7)
As in Romer (1986), the aggregate capital stock serves as a proxy for knowl-
edge, which gives rise to a (potentially) positive production externality. The
magnitude of the production externality is determined by factor (1 − α).
As long as α is strictly smaller than unity, there is a positive externality of
capital accumulation.6
We conclude this description with two important remarks. First, on an
aggregate level, considering (7) together with the labor market clearing con-
dition, L(t) = P (t) = 1, production is given by: Y (t) = AK(t), and the
market interest and wage rates are obtained by:
r(t) = r = αA− δ , w(t) = (1− α)AK(t) . (8)
6Certainly, the analysis can be extended to negative production externalities, that is,
α > 1. This case, however is in contrast with the evidence, given in the introduction.
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That is, the production externality has a direct impact on the rate of interest.
The larger the externality, the lower is the market interest rate as compared
to the socially optimal rate of interest: A − δ. Second, the aggregate stock
of capital evolves according to:
K˙(t) = Y (t)− C(t)− δ K(t) . (9)
2.1 The Market Economy
Every household inelastically supplies labor services and chooses consump-
tion at all t ≥ v such as to maximize expected lifetime utility (2) subject to
its intertemporal budget constraint:
a(v, t) + h(t)−
∫ ∞
t
c(v, τ) e−R
A(t,τ) dτ = 0 , (10)
where a(v, t) stands for time-t assets of a vintage-v household, and h(t) ≡∫∞
t
w(τ) e−R
A(t,τ)dτ is the discounted integral of future wage payments. In
the market framework, a household does not consider the impact of its indi-
vidual consumption on average consumption (on the consumption reference
level, X).
The market framework is one in which individuals may buy or sell ac-
tuarially fair notes, for which they pay or receive an interest rate rA(t).
The notes are canceled upon death of an individual. Actuarial fairness re-
quires rA(t) = r(t) + β. In this framework, the relevant discount factor is:
RA(t, τ) ≡ ∫ τ
t
[r(s) + β] d s.7
7The transversality condition required to prevent households from running Ponzi
schemes is: limτ→∞ e−R
A(t,τ) a(v, τ) = 0. Clearly, budget constraint (10) follows from
combining the budget identity, a˙(v, t) = rA(t) a(v, t) +w(t)− c(v, t), with the transversal-
ity condition.
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Define gx(t) ≡ X˙(t)/X(t), and Γ(t, τ) =
∫ τ
t
gx(s) ds.
8 Then, the first
order conditions are:
c(v, t) eΓ(t,τ) γ
(σ−1)
σ
+
(ρ+β)
σ
(t−τ)−RA(t,τ) (σ−1)
σ = c(v, τ) e−R
A(t,τ) , τ ≥ t . (11)
Define ζ(t) ≡ σ−1 ρ + (1 − σ−1)r(t) + β. Integration of both sides of (11)
yields:
c(v, t) = ζ(t) [a(v, t) + h(t)]− γ (1− σ−1) gx(t) [a(v, t) + h(t)] . (12)
As we do not consider a bequests motive, we have a(t, t) = 0, hence,
c(t, t) = ζ(t)h(t)− γ (1− σ−1) gx(t)h(t) . (12a)
Notice that consumption levels are not equal across cohorts. Consumption
levels are proportional to wealth, with a factor of proportionality given by:
[ζ(t)− γ (1− σ−1) gx(t)]. As a(t, t) = 0, we know that a(t, t) is smaller than
average wealth. Thus c(t, t) is smaller than average consumption.
Differentiating (11) with respect to τ yields:
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
=
r(t)− ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
X˙(t)
X(t)
. (13)
The growth rate of individual consumption not only depends on the rate of
interest and the pure rate of time preference but it also depends positively
on the growth rate of the consumption reference stock. It does not directly
depend on β.
Aggregation. Aggregate wealth, Ω(t), is given by Ω(t) ≡ β ∫ t−∞ e−β (t−v) a(v, t) dv.
8Throughout the paper, gz denotes the growth rate of some variable z.
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Capital market clearing requires Ω(t) = K(t). Similarly, aggregate consump-
tion is defined by C(t) ≡ β ∫ t−∞ e−β (t−v) c(v, t) dv. Differentiation of aggre-
gate consumption with respect to time, and using (13) yields:
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
r(t)− ρ
σ
− β ζ(t) Ω(t)
C(t)
+ γ (1− σ−1) X˙(t)
X(t)
(
1 + β
Ω(t)
C(t)
)
.
We are now ready to represent aggregate behavior by a series of differen-
tial equations in the variables κ(t) ≡ K(t)/X(t), and χ(t) ≡ C(t)/X(t):9
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
r(t)− ρ
σ
+ γ (1− σ−1) X˙(t)
X(t)
− β
[
ζ(t)− γ (1− σ−1) X˙(t)
X(t)
]
κ(t)
χ(t)
,
(14)
X˙(t)
X(t)
= ϕ(χ(t)− 1) , (3’)
K˙(t)
K(t)
= A− δ − χ(t)
κ(t)
. (15)
Equation (14) deserves four remarks. First, aggregate consumption growth
depends on the difference between the rate of interest and the pure rate of
time preference. If β = γ = 0, equation (14) represents the usual Euler
equation. Second, if, in addition, consumption causes a negative externality,
the consumption growth rate is raised by the growth of the reference stock.
This is intuitive. From the viewpoint of an individual household, if all other
households raise their rates of consumption growth (and thereby the refer-
ence stock), the best response of the individual household will be to raise his
or her rate of consumption growth as well. As a consequence, aggregate con-
sumption growth increases in the negative consumption externality. Third, if
the length of lifetime is finite, β > 0, consumption growth not only depends
9Notice that the dynamics of the model is two-dimensional: χ˙ = χ˙(χ, κ), κ˙ = κ˙(χ, κ).
The dimension of the stable manifold is one, and the system is saddle point stable.
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on the reference stock but also on the capital stock.10 As the term in square
brackets is positive11, a rise in β lowers the aggregate consumption growth
rate. This effect is due to the “intergenerational turnover effect,” which is
discussed in Lemma 1, below. Forth, a rise in the production externality
(a decline in α) lowers the consumption growth rate. A decline in α lowers
the rate of interest according to (8), and we expect the rate of consumption
growth to decline: −∂ (C˙/C)/∂ r = −(1− β(σ − 1))/σ < 0.
The second equation, above, displays the dynamics of the reference stock.
It is a restatement of equation (3). Capital accumulation (15) follows from
(9).
Before analyzing the impact of finite horizons in more detail, we note
an important relationship between individual and aggregate consumption
growth, which is obtained by differentiating the definition of C(t) with respect
to time: C˙(t) = β c(t, t) − β C(t) + β ∫ t−∞ [c˙(v, t)/c(v, t)] c(v, t) e−β (t−v) dv.
Using (13) and (12a) yields:
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
− β C(t)− c(t, t)
C(t)
=
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
− β Ω(t)
Ω(t) + h(t)
. (16)
If β > 0, the rate of aggregate consumption growth is smaller than the rate of
individual consumption growth. The difference in individual and aggregate
growth rates is caused by the intergenerational turnover effect.
Intergenerational Turnover Effect. According to (16), aggregate and individ-
ual rates of consumption growth differ if and only if β > 0 and c(t, t) 6= C(t).
10If β = 0 (ILA case) the capital stock has no effect on consumption growth, as long as
the rate of interest is independent of K, as is the case here. This was already shown by
Carroll et al. (1997).
11The term in square brackets in (14) is positive by the fact that c(v, t) > 0, as can
easily be verified by (12).
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The following Lemma 1 is particularly useful for explaining the differences
between optimal growth paths and those obtained in a decentralized, com-
petitive equilibrium.
LEMMA 1 (Intergenerational Turnover Effect) If β > 0, c(v, t) has
the following properties:
(i) c(v, t) is proportional to wealth [a(v, t)+h(t)], where the factor of propor-
tionality is positive and invariant with respect to the vintage index v;
(ii) c(t, t)− C(t) < 0;
(iii) c˙(v, t)/c(v, t) = c˙(v′, t)/c(v′, t), for all v, v′ ≤ t;
(iv) the difference in individual and aggregate consumption growth rates,
[c˙(v, t)/c(v, t)− C˙(t)/C(t)], rises in β;
(v) the difference in individual and aggregate consumption levels,
|c(t, t)− C(t)|, rises in the level of capital. .
The lemma shows an important property of the C-OLG model. While the
growth rate of individual consumption is independent of wealth, the growth
rate of aggregate consumption depends on wealth when β > 0.
By (13), individual consumption growth rates are independent of wealth
(κ). If c(v, t) were equal to c(v′, t) for all v ≤ t, then c(t, t) would be equal
to C(t), and the aggregate consumption growth rate would be equal to the
individual one. However, individual consumption levels rise in wealth, and
c(t, t) < C(t). Therefore, (c˙(v, t)/c(v, t)) > (C˙(t)/C(t)). Intuitively, existing
(wealthy) individuals are replaced by newborn individuals without wealth
(“intergenerational turnover”), which lowers the average (aggregate) con-
sumption growth rate.
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2.2 The Planner’s Objective
Following Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), our planner’s objective, at time t, is the
sum of two components. First, the integral of the lifetime expected utilities
of representative agents from each of the generations to be born, as measured
from the time of birth. Second, the integral of the lifetime expected utilities
over the remainder of their lifetimes of representative agents from all cohorts
alive at time t, measured from the perspective of his and her birthdate.12
The planner’s discount rate needs not equal the private pure time-preference
rate. In the following, however, we assume both discount rates to coincide.13
Welfare at time t is
W (t) =
∫ ∞
t
{∫ ∞
v
u(c(v, τ), X(τ))eρ(v−τ) β e−β(τ−v) dτ
}
e−ρ(v−t) d v
+
∫ t
−∞
{∫ ∞
t
u(c(v, τ), X(τ))eρ(v−τ) β e−β(τ−v) dτ
}
e−ρ(v−t) d v .
Define age as y ≡ t − v (number of “years”), and change the order of inte-
gration. Then,
W (t) =
∫ ∞
t
{∫ ∞
0
u(c(τ − y, τ), X(τ))β e(ρ−(ρ+β)) y d y
}
e−ρ(τ−t) d τ . (17)
The planner’s problem of maximizing (17) subject to
(i) C(τ) = β
∫∞
0
e−β y c(τ − y, τ) d y ,
(ii) X˙(τ) = ϕ(C(τ)−X(τ)) ,
(iii) K˙(τ) = (A− δ)K(τ)− C(τ) ,
can be clarified by decomposing it into two stages. First, given levels of
12As shown by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), discounting back to birthdates ensures time-
consistency of optimal fiscal policy.
13The more general case case where the planners’ discount rate potentially is different
from ρ is available as a working paper from the author. This case, however, does not add
substantive results to the analysis.
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aggregate consumption C(τ) and X(τ), the planner must allocate C(τ) in
order to maximize time τ welfare:
∫∞
0
u(c(τ − y, τ), X(τ))β e(ρ−(ρ+β)) y d y:
V [C(τ), X(τ)] = max
{c(τ−y,τ}∞y=0
∫ ∞
0
u(c(τ − y, τ), X(τ))β e(ρ−(ρ+β)) y d y , (18)
subject to constraint (i). At the second stage, the planner’s problem becomes
the optimal control problem of choosing C(τ), andX(τ), such as to maximize
W (t) =
∫ ∞
t
V [C(τ), X(τ)] e−ρ(τ−t) d τ , (19)
subject to constraints (ii) and (iii). As can easily be shown,
V [C(τ), X(τ)] =
[C(τ)X(τ)−γ]1−σ
1− σ . (20)
Next, we characterize both individual and aggregate consumption. De-
note the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint of stage 1 above
by λ:
λ(τ) = c(τ − y, τ)−σX(τ)−γ(1−σ) . (21)
It follows that cy(τ − y, τ) = 0. This is very intuitive. An allocation of
aggregate consumption is optimal, if there is no incentive to shift consump-
tion between cohorts at any time τ . As private and social discount rates are
equal, it is optimal to implement an egalitarian plan under which all cohorts
receive the same consumption level at any point in time.
Aggregate consumption growth follows from the first order conditions of
the Hamiltonian (see appendix) as well as from the canonical equations:
C˙(τ)
C(τ)
=
r˜ − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
X˙(τ)
X(τ)
− γ
σ
χ˙(τ) (1− γ χ(τ))−1 , (22)
where r˜ ≡ A − δ defines the social rate of interest. As for any given time,
all individual consumption levels are identical in the command optimum,
15
individual and aggregate consumption growth rates coincide:
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
=
c˙(t, t)
c(t, t)
. (23)
We end this section by observing three important properties of the com-
mand optimum. First, optimal consumption is independent of β. In the
market economy, this is true on an individual level only. Aggregate con-
sumption growth, however, depends on β in the market economy. Second, if
γ = 0, we are back to the standard Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey representative
agent planning model. Moreover, as in the decentralized economy, individual
consumption growth rates are independent of age. Third, in contrast to the
market economy, individual consumption levels are independent of age in the
command optimum.
3 Overlapping Generations,
Consumption and Production Externalities
In the previous literature14, it was shown that in ILA economies with exoge-
nous labor supply, a consumption externality has an impact on the steady
state only in the presence of a production externality. Moreover, a consump-
tion externality alone has no impact on transitional paths when the reference
level is given by current average consumption. In the following, we comple-
ment the above findings and show that consumption externalities generally
do have an impact, both along transitional paths and in steady state, if
agents live for a finite time only (β > 0). We also briefly address the impact
14See Liu and Turnovsky (2005), and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007)
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of β on the speed of convergence at the end of this section.15
3.1 Comparison of Steady State Equilibria
In a steady state, the growth rates of aggregate consumption, capital, and
the reference stock are equal.16 Denote this growth rate as g∗ for the market
economy (the “market growth rate”), and as g˜ for the planner’s solution (the
“optimal growth rate”). It follows that κ(t) and χ(t) are constant in a steady
state. Define σ˜ ≡ σ− γ(σ− 1) > 1. We first consider the impact of β on the
steady state growth rate, and on κ and χ. We then consider the distortionary
effects of the externalities.
LEMMA 2 Consider an economy without a production externality (α = 1).
Then, the optimal steady state growth rate exceeds the market growth rate if
and only if β > 0:
g˜ =
r˜ − ρ
σ˜
, g∗ =
r − ρ− β σ
σ˜
. (24)
Proof. Calculate g∗ by equating (14) with (3) and (15), and g˜ by equating
(22) with (3) and (15). Clearly, as α = 1 we have r˜ = r, and the lemma
follows. ‖
Lemma 2 shows that the aggregate optimal and market growth rates do not
15All of the following results hold regardless of whether the planner and market discount
rates are equal or not. Differences of the discount rates as a source of distortion are
emphasized by Abel (2005). Such differences are one source of distortion here as well.
However, to sharpen the main results we assume that the planner and the market discount
the future at the same rate.
16The necessary and sufficient condition for a positive steady state to exist, in a market
economy, is: (r − ρ − β σ)(r˜ + β) + (r˜ − r)β σ > 0. That is, a sufficient condition is:
(r − ρ− β σ) > 0.
17
coincide when β > 0. This is true regardless of whether there is a con-
sumption externality or not. Even if γ = 0 — thereby σ˜ = σ — Lemma 2
shows that g˜ > g∗ whenever β > 0. The market growth rate of aggregate
consumption is smaller than the optimal growth rate because of the intergen-
erational turnover effect, indicated in Lemma 1 (property iv). This difference
in growth rates, when γ = 0, does not indicate any distortion. However, we
show below that Lemma 2 proves important to demonstrate the existence of
a distortion in case γ > 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of a rise in β on κ and χ in the steady
state. The Figure shows, in (χ, κ) space, all loci for which χ˙ = 0, and all
loci for which κ˙ = 0. The former loci are denoted by χχ, the latter by κκ.
Socially optimal loci and values are marked with a tilde.
The κκ-curve follows from K˙/K = X˙/X. It is the same for both a social
optimum and a market economy, and it is independent of both externalities
— that is, the κκ-curve is independent of the parameters α, β, γ. Its slope is
clearly positive17, and increasing in (χ, κ) space. Intuitively, the propensity
to consume (χ/κ) declines along the convex κκ-curve, as κ rises. This leads
to a rise in savings and capital growth. Constancy of κ then requires a higher
growth rate of the reference stock, which is implied by a higher χ.
The χχ-curve follows from X˙/X = C˙/C. Only if β = 0, it is the same for
both a social optimum and a market economy, in which case it is independent
of κ, according to (14). If β > 0, two additional properties characterize
consumption growth. First, wealth of young cohorts is smaller than wealth
17Observe that gX = gX( χ
(+)
), and gK = gK( χ
(−)
, κ
(+)
). For a given κ, a rise in χ raises gX
and lowers gK , and κ˙ < 0. By increasing κ, κ˙ rises and becomes zero again, as required
along the κκ locus.
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of elder cohorts, and the aggregate consumption growth rate declines, as
shown by Lemma 1 (iv). Second, consumption growth depends on wealth,
and thereby on κ. Thus, for a given κ, a rise in β requires a decline in χ, to
ensure that χ˙ = 0. In other words, as a consequence of a rise in β, the χχ
locus shifts downward in (χ, κ) space.
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
Figure 1 shows that χ declines in β. It is largest at the social optimum (point
A)18, and becomes lower, as β rises (points B and C). From (3’), gX declines
in χ. In a steady state, g = gX = gK = gC . Therefore, the steady state
growth rate declines in β, as stated in the discussion above.
Distortionary Impact of a Consumption Externality. To show the distor-
tionary impact of externalities, we need to consider individual consumption
growth rates rather than aggregate ones. If α = 1 and γ = 0, equations (13)
and (22) show that individual market and optimal consumption growth rates
are equal, regardless of whether β is zero or not.
PROPOSITION 1 Consider an economy with inelastic labor supply and
without a production externality (α = 1). Then, the optimal individual con-
sumption growth rate, in steady state, exceeds the market growth rate if and
only if β > 0 and γ > 0. That is, in the C-OLG economy, the consumption
externality introduces a distortion (an inefficiency) even without a concurrent
production externality.
18If β = 0, χ˜ = χ in a steady state.
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Proof. If γ = 0, individual optimal and market growth rates are equal,
even if β > 0: g˜c|γ=0 = g∗c |γ=0 = (r− ρ)/σ. However, if γ > 0, the individual
consumption growth rates become:
g˜c =
r − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
g˜ = g˜ =
r − ρ
σ˜
,
g∗c =
r − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
g∗ =
r − ρ− β γ(σ − 1)
σ˜
. ‖
Clearly, if β > 0, the negative consumption externality introduces a distor-
tion (an inefficiency): g˜c > g
∗
c . Proposition 1 essentially follows from an
“overconsumption” (“undersaving” or “undergrowth”) result. Households
consume more than optimal, and save less than optimal. Therefore, the rate
of consumption growth is lower than optimal. The economic intuition is as
follows.
A rise in γ raises the desired individual consumption growth rates in
both the market economy and the command optimum. The reason is seen to
come from a rise in the (steady state) intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in individual consumption, which amounts to σ˜−1. The higher γ the more
a household is willing to substitute intertemporally, as the reference stock
diminishes the utility gain derived by a given increase in consumption.
In the market economy, the negative consumption externality gives rise
to overconsumption. Households consume more and save less than optimal.
The level of savings, however, determines the consumption growth rate. An
increase in γ strengthens the extent of overconsumption, and thereby raises
the optimal consumption growth rate by more than the market growth rate.
If and only if β > 0, the consumption externality introduces a distortion
(an inefficiency). In the competitive equilibrium, a household does not con-
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sider the impact of its individual consumption on the consumption reference
level, X. Considering the definition of aggregate consumption, this impact
is given by:
∂ X˙(t)
∂ c(v, t)
= ϕβ e−β(t−v) ≥ 0 . (25)
Equation (25) shows that the impact of individual consumption on the con-
sumption reference level is strictly positive, when β > 0. As the consumption
reference level enters all other individuals’ utilities — and individual house-
holds do not consider this impact —, the resulting competitive equilibrium
is not Pareto efficient.19 Individual households overconsume. Therefore, the
competitive equilibrium is not optimal, and the consumption externality is
distortionary.20
In the context of the ILA framework (β = 0), equation (25) shows that
the impact of individual consumption on the consumption reference level is
zero. Thus, the consumption externality does not introduce a distortion in
the infinite horizon case, while the externality does introduce a distortion in
the finite horizon case.
Positive Production Externality. In a market economy, consumption growth
(savings) is governed by the private (rather than the social) rate of return.
Therefore, a decline in α (an increase in the positive production externality)
lowers the consumption growth rate – and thereby the steady state growth
rates. The production externality does not have an impact on the social op-
19In contrast, the social planner considers the impact of consumption on the reference
level.
20Certainly, the consumption externality introduces a distortion not only for the em-
ployed social welfare function (17) but for other social welfare functions as well. If γ > 0,
the equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. Thus, there is no social welfare function, for which
such an equilibrium is optimal.
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timum. While the production externality always introduces a distortion, the
consumption externality introduces a distortion only when β > 0 or there is
a concurrent production externality.
PROPOSITION 2 In an overlapping generations economy with inelastic
labor supply and with γ > 0, a rise in the consumption externality exacerbates
the distortion between market growth rates and optimal growth rates the more
the larger is β.
Proof. It can easily be verified that ∂ (g˜c − g∗c )/∂ γ = β σ (σ − 1)/σ˜2 > 0.
Also, ∂ 2(g˜c − g∗c )/(∂ γ ∂ β) = σ (σ − 1)/σ˜2 > 0. As σ > 1, both derivatives
are positive. ‖
Without a consumption externality, the market allocation is efficient. Propo-
sition 1 shows that the consumption externality is a source of inefficiency,
when β > 0. This inefficiency rises in γ, and it rises the more the larger the
β.
Even if there is no production externality, the consumption externality
raises the (positive) difference between the socially optimal and the mar-
ket consumption growth rates. This result is specific to the finite lifetimes of
households in the overlapping generations framework. For the infinitely-lived
agent economy, the consumption externality alone, without capital external-
ity, has no impact on the steady state growth rates.
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To shed light on Proposition 2, notice that the higher the β, the lower is
the aggregate growth rate g∗, as shown in Lemma 2.21 The individual market
consumption growth rate depends positively on the aggregate growth rate (of
the reference level). Thus, the higher the β the lower the rise in aggregate
growth, thereby the lower the rise in the individual consumption growth rate,
upon a rise in γ. As the optimal growth rate is independent of β, the distor-
tionary impact of the consumption externality rises in β.
Impact of the Externality on Levels. We next briefly investigate the relation-
ships between socially optimal and market consumption and capital levels.
In an economy with inelastic labor supply and without a production ex-
ternality, the stronger is the consumption externality the higher are χ, κ, and
κ/χ, and the stronger is the distortion with respect to χ and κ. This result
is proven in the appendix. Intuitively, a rise in γ increases the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in individual consumption. Therefore agents prefer
a higher rate of consumption growth, which is accomplished by lowering the
steady state propensity to consume out of wealth: χ/κ.
Initially, upon the rise in γ, consumption is lowered, as households raise
the rate of consumption growth. Due to the negative consumption external-
ity, households lower the consumption levels by less than optimal. Conse-
quently, the consumption growth effect of the externality is lower in a market
economy as compared to the command optimum.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
21The higher is β, the smaller is the fraction of older, wealthy people with a high
consumption level, and therefore, the smaller is the consumption growth effect of γ on
aggregate consumption growth, according to property (iv) of Lemma 1.
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Figure 2 illustrates these results. As of a rise in γ, the χχ locus shifts
down and outwards to the right. It intersects the original χχ locus at χ =
1⇔ g∗ = 0, and is located above for χ > 1. As the positively sloped κκ line
is independent of γ, the steady state levels of κ, χ, and g∗ increase.
At the same time, a rise in γ induces the vertical χ˜χ line to shift parallel
to the right. The κκ locus is the same for both the market economy and the
command optimum. The dots indicate the old and new optimal steady state
equilibria.
There is an important lesson to be learnt from the previous discussion.
In the C-OLG framework, consumption levels are higher than optimal, and
the savings rate (1 − χ/κ) is lower than optimal. Figure 2 shows that the
market savings rate falls the shorter of the optimal one the higher is γ. This
finding helps explaining the low savings rates observed in many industrialized
countries.
We end this subsection by considering the impact of a production exter-
nality, that is, (1 − α) > 0, on steady state allocations. Certainly, α has
no impact on the command optimum, as the planner takes the production
externality into account. However, individual households take Z(t) as given,
and A− δ = r˜ ≥ r = αA− δ. The steady state market growth rate becomes:
g∗ =
r − ρ− β σ
2σ˜
+
β + r˜
2
− 1
2
√(
−r − ρ− β σ
σ˜
+ (β + r˜)
)2
+
4 β σ
σ˜
(r − r˜) .
(26)
Notice that the production externality is decreasing in α. Thus, for evaluating
a rise in the production externality, we consider −∂ (.)/(∂ α) in the following
proposition.
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PROPOSITION 3 Consider an overlapping generations economy. The
production externality raises the difference between the socially optimal growth
rate and the market growth rate:
−∂ (g˜ − g
∗)
∂ α
> 0 .
The production externality exacerbates the distortionary impact of the con-
sumption externality.
Proposition 3 passes on two results. First, the production externality causes
optimal and market growth rates to differ from each other, which does not
come as a surprise. When α declines — that is, the production externality
increases — the market rate of interest also declines. As a consequence, the
individual consumption growth rates fall, and so does the aggregate one.
As the socially optimal growth rate is not affected by α, a decline in α
strengthens the distortion g˜c − g∗c . Second, the consumption and production
externalities exacerbate each other. The higher is γ the more are households
willing to substitute intertemporally. That is, the impact of a given decline
in α (thereby in r) on the individual consumption growth rate is the stronger,
the higher is the consumption externality.
3.2 Dynamics
Externalities not only have an impact on steady state paths but also on tran-
sitional dynamics. Here, we characterize transition paths, and compare those
obtained from the market economy framework with optimal transition paths.
We will end this subsection by a note on the impact of β on (asymptotic)
convergence speeds in market economies.
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In the following, in order to clarify the discussion of dynamics, we present
some results in terms of the general utility functions u(.) and V (.) rather than
the corresponding specified CRRA functions. As before, an asterisk refers to
variables of the market economy, while a tilde refers to variables of the social
optimum.
The market economy framework implies the following growth rate of in-
dividual consumption:
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
= (r − ρ) θ∗(v, t) , (27)
where θ∗(v, t) is the transitional intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption of the market economy.22 In the social optimum, consumption
grows according to:
c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
= (r˜ − ρ) θ˜(v, t) , (28)
where θ˜(v, t) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption in
the social optimum.23 Clearly, the growth rates of individual consumption in
the two economies coincide if and only if (r− ρ) θ∗(v, t) = (r˜− ρ) θ˜(v, t). To
shed light on the dynamics, we will now discuss transitional dynamics for a
number of important cases. In particular, we demonstrate that a consump-
tion externality introduces a distortion with respect to the optimal transition
paths in the cases listed in Table 1.
22Partial derivatives are denoted by subindexes. E.g., uc(v, t) stands for
∂ u(c(v, t), X(t))/∂ c(v, t).
23θ∗(v, t) ≡ − uc(v,t)(
ucc(v,t)+ucX(v,t)
X˙(t)
c˙(v,t)
)
c(v,t)
,
θ˜(v, t) ≡ − VC(t)+VX(t)(
VCC(t)+VCX(t)+
X˙(t)
C˙(t)
(VCX(t)+VXX(t))
)
C(t)
.
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Table 1.
Distortionary Impact of Consumption Externality
ILA (β = 0) C-OLG (β > 0)
ϕ→∞: X(t) ≡ C(t) no yes (g˜c > g∗c )
ϕ <∞: X˙(t) = ϕ (C(t)−X(t)) yes (g˜c < g∗c ) yes (g˜c ≷ g∗c )
The indicated signs holds for χ˙ > 0, and even for α = 1. To sharpen
our results, in all cases, we assume that there is no production externality
(α = 1).
PROPOSITION 4 Consider an economy with β = 0. The consumption
externality does not introduce a distortion with respect to the optimal transi-
tion paths if and only if:
˙(uX
uc
)
|c=C = 0 . (29)
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. Proposition 4 encom-
passes two important cases.
Case 1. ϕ→∞ : X(t) ≡ C(t). For this case, the consumption externality is
represented by current aggregate (average) consumption, and condition (29)
becomes:24
˙(uC
uc
)
|c=C = 0 .
Condition (29) clearly holds for our CRRA specification of the utility function
(1). It says that the marginal rate of substitution of C(t) for c(v, t) is constant
through time. A proportionate increase in both c(v, t) and C(t) does not
24When ϕ → ∞, X is to be replaced by C. As β = 0, individual consumption cannot
be differentiated according to birth date: c(v, t) = c(t). In equilibrium, c(t) = C(t).
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alter this marginal rate of substitution. For a given consumption level at
some time t, θ∗(v, t) = θ˜(v, t), and all variables in the market economy grow
at socially optimal rates along the transition paths.
Proposition 4 does not imply that the consumption externality does not
have any impact on transition paths. It shows that the consumption exter-
nality does not introduce a distortion, that is, the externality has the same
impact in both frameworks, the market economy and the social optimum.
Suppose, there is a production externality (1 − α > 0) in addition to
the consumption externality. Then r˜ > r, ˜˙C(t) > C˙∗(t), and C˜(t + ∆) >
C∗(t + ∆), in which case, condition (29) does not longer hold. With a pro-
duction externality, Proposition 4 shows that transition paths deviate. Con-
sumption growth is larger in a social optimum than in the market economy,
and the consumption externality here influences the distortion introduced by
the production externality.
Case 2: ϕ < ∞: X˙(t) = ϕ (C(t)−X(t)). As can easily be verified, condi-
tion (29) does not hold for our CRRA utility function, when γ > 0. Over
time, the marginal rate of substitution changes according to: ˙(uX/uc) =
−γ ˙[c(v, t)/X(t)] = −γ ˙[χ(t)]. The consumption externality introduces a dis-
tortion with respect to transition paths, even in the absence of a production
externality (and even with exogenous labor supply). Three remarks are in
order.
First, the nature of the distortion (sign) depends on whether the optimal
χ(t) is smaller than or larger than its steady state value. If χ(t) is below
its steady state value, χ˙(t) > 0 along the transition path. In this case,
g˜c < g
∗
c . That is, the optimal consumption growth rate is lower than the
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market growth rate.
The social planner internalizes the negative consumption externality, while
individual households do not. Therefore, the social planner “penalizes”
χ˙ > 0. If χ˙ > 0, it follows that gC > gX , and X˙ > 0. That is, the ref-
erence level, which lowers utility of all households, increases. The consump-
tion externality raises the (transitional) optimal intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, θ˜(v, t), by less than the decentralized one, θ∗(v, t), and g˜c < g∗c .
Second, condition (29) fails to hold for a wide class of utility functions and
specifications of consumption externalities. In particular, along a transition
path, (29) does not hold for the class of CRRA utility functions, including
the externality specifications proposed by Dupor and Liu (2003).25
Third, only in a steady state, χ does not change over time. Therefore,
the consumption externality does not introduce a distortion in the steady
state, when β = 0. Along the transition path, however, the consumption
externality always introduces a distortion.
PROPOSITION 5 Consider an overlapping generations economy (β > 0).
If lifetimes are finite, the consumption externality always introduces a distor-
tion (an inefficiency) with respect to the optimal transition paths.
As for the ILA framework (β = 0) above, we consider two cases: ϕ → ∞,
and ϕ <∞.
25They propose a utility function that includes, as special cases, many standard speci-
fications of consumption externalities used in the literature:
v(c,X) =
1
1− σ
[(
cµ − γ Xµ
1− γ
)1/µ]1−σ
,
where the utility function we employ follows from the limit as µ approaches zero. Clearly,
(vX/vc) = −γ (c/X)1−µ, which is constant over time in a steady state only.
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Case 1. ϕ → ∞ : X(t) ≡ C(t). In an ILA economy, the consumption
externality did not cause a distortion. Proposition 5 shows that for a C-OLG
economy, the consumption externality creates a distortion in transitional
paths (even in the absence of a production externality). With β > 0, the
market’s aggregate consumption growth rate is smaller than the individual
consumption growth rate, due to the intergenerational turnover effect. In
contrast to the optimal growth rate, in a market economy, the consumption
reference level — aggregate consumption — grows by less than individual
consumption. As individual growth rates positively depend on the aggregate
growth rate, g˜c > g
∗
c .
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Case 2: ϕ < ∞: X˙(t) = ϕ (C(t)−X(t)). In an ILA economy, we showed
that the consumption externality caused the optimal individual consumption
growth rate to fall short of the market growth rate. The reason was seen to be
the “internalization effect” (the social planner internalizes the consumption
externality, while households do not). With β > 0, a second, opposing
effect enters the story: the intergenerational turnover effect, described above
for Case 1. It cannot generally be determined whether the internalization
effect dominates the intergenerational turnover effect or not. If, however, β
is “very small,” the internalization effect dominates, and g˜c < g
∗
c . If χ˙ is
positive and “very small,” the intergenerational turnover effect dominates,
and g˜c > g
∗
c . In particular, close enough to the steady state, as χ˙ is close
to zero, the intergenerational turnover effect always dominates. That is, the
overconsumption result (g˜c > g
∗
c ) not only holds in the steady state but also
26The distortion becomes immediate when considering: g˜c = (r−ρ)/σ+γ (σ− 1)/σ g˜C ,
and g∗c = (r − ρ)/σ + γ (σ − 1)/σ g∗C , where g∗C < g˜C when β > 0.
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along the transition path, close to the steady state.
There are two lessons to be drawn from this discussion. First, along the
transition path, it is possible to observe a switch from g˜c < g
∗
c to g˜c > g
∗
c .
Second, close to the steady state, g˜c > g
∗
c . This finding reverses the result
given by the ILA framework, where g˜c < g
∗
c along the transition path.
Speed of Convergence.
Finally, we briefly consider the impact of longevity on the asymptotic speed
of convergence in the C-OLG model (a detailed account is available from the
author upon request). In the previous section we already showed that a rise
in β has a dampening effect on steady state growth in a market economy. The
same holds along the stable trajectory as well. The higher the β the stronger
is the fraction of older, wealthy consumers with a high consumption level,
and the smaller is aggregate consumption growth. This intergenerational
turnover effect is the stronger, the larger is κ. Consequently, the rise in κ
along the stable arm has a dampening effect on growth, when β > 0. This
dampening effect is absent in the ILA model, where β = 0.
In numerical terms, with β > 0 and γ > 0, and for reasonable calibrations,
our model implies asymptotic convergence speeds below 3% a year. This
result accords with empirical evidence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, and
Mankiw et al. 1992). This property of the C-OLG model is important, as
the typical one-sector ILA growth model implies convergence speeds that are
too high and not consistent with empirical evidence.27
27It goes without saying that finiteness of lifetime is just one mechanism lowering the
implied convergence speed of the growth model. The introduction of a second (sluggish)
capital stock will result in a similar decline of the convergence speed, as does the intro-
duction of adjustment costs of investment.
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4 Conclusions
The impact of externalities on economic growth is usually considered in
economies populated with infinitely-lived households. In this paper, we con-
sider the question of how the finiteness of lifetimes (a “finite horizon”) affects
the effects of externalities on economic growth. We employ an overlapping
generations model in continuous time (C-OLG model) for our analysis.
This endeavor is motivated by two facts. First, we argue that a con-
sumption externality cannot be treated most appropriately in a symmetrical
context, where the individual consumption levels of all households are the
same, as the externality stems from different consumption levels. The C-
OLG model introduces the required heterogeneity. As wealth differs among
cohorts, so do individual consumption levels. Therefore, the C-OLG frame-
work is a natural framework to consider consumption externalities. Second,
the introduction of finite lifetimes (a finite horizon) has a significant impact
on the answer to the research question, whether or not externalities introduce
an inefficiency (a distortion).
We show that significant results discussed in the literature only hold at the
limit, when agents are infinitely-lived. However, they cease to hold in finite-
horizon economies. E.g., with a finite horizon, a consumption externality
always introduces a distortion (an inefficiency) with respect to steady state
growth rates, even if there is no production externality (and labor supply
is exogenous). Likewise, a consumption externality introduces a distortion
with respect to transitional paths, even if the externality stems from current
average consumption. These results do not hold when agents are infinitely-
lived.
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Another result concerns the nature of the distortion caused by a consump-
tion externality that stems from a slowly adjusting reference level. In an
economy with infinitely-lived agents, optimal consumption growth is smaller
than the growth rate observed in a market economy along the transition path.
In contrast, in the C-OLG model, optimal consumption growth exceeds the
market growth rate along the transition path, close to the steady state. That
is, in a decentralized economy, consumption levels are higher than optimal,
and the savings rate is lower than optimal. This finding helps explaining the
low savings rates observed in many industrialized countries.
Next, the finiteness of lifetime reduces the speed of convergence to a
magnitude that accords with empirical evidence. This finding is important,
as the typical one-sector ILA growth model implies convergence speeds that
are too high and not consistent with empirical evidence.
The reason for the distortionary effect (inefficiency) introduced by a con-
sumption externalities is seen to come from overconsumption. The impact
of individual consumption on the consumption reference level is strictly pos-
itive, when lifetime is finite, that is, β > 0. As the consumption reference
level enters (negatively) all other individuals’ utilities, and individual house-
holds do not consider this impact, the resulting competitive equilibrium is
not Pareto efficient. Therefore, the consumption externality is distortionary
in the C-OLG model. In the ILA framework, in contrast, this impact of
individual consumption on the reference level is shown to be nil. Thus, the
consumption externality does not introduce a distortion in the infinite hori-
zon case, while it introduces a distortion in the finite horizon case.
These results have important (optimal) fiscal policy implications. First,
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the results support arguments in favor of a shift in the tax base towards con-
sumption, as a negative consumption externality implies overconsumption in
the C-OLG framework (which never is the case in the ILA framework). The
distortion always occurs, regardless of the presence of production external-
ities. Second, regarding the design of optimal policy, in the ILA case, the
only instrument needed is a capital income tax to correct for the production
externality. With finitely-lived agents, however, a consumption tax is needed
in addition. Along the transition path, in the ILA case, two instruments are
required: a capital income tax along with a consumption tax. With finitely-
lived agents, the optimal consumption tax needs not only vary in time, but
it needs to be age-conditioned, in addition. An optimum can be obtained
only, once a sufficiently rich set of policy instruments is available.
I hope this study helps to clarify the differences in effects of externalities
between the ILA and C-OLG frameworks, and it will contribute to the future
debate on economic growth, cross-country income dynamics, and externali-
ties.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1. Property (i) is shown in (12). The factor of propor-
tionality is given by [ζ(t) − γ (1 − σ−1) gx(t)], which is positive by the fact
that c(v, t) > 0. |
Property (ii) follows from the fact that at any given point in time 0 =
a(t, t) < Ω(t). From (i) it follows that c(t, t) falls short of average (ag-
gregate) consumption, which is given by C(t). Formally, C(t) − c(t, t) =
[ζ(t)− γ (1− σ−1) gx(t)] Ω(t). |
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Property (iii) is shown in (13): individual consumption growth rates are
equal across cohorts. |
Property (iv): Consider that β represents the (“intergenerational turnover”)
rate at which existing, wealthy cohorts are replaced by newborn individuals
without wealth. For given individual and aggregate consumption levels, a
rise in β increases the share of young households who hold no wealth at all.
While consumption growth rates are equal across generations (by iii), a rise in
β amounts to a rise in the share of consumers with a below-average consump-
tion level (by ii). Therefore, the average consumption growth rate declines
in β. Formally, β [C(t) − c(t, t)]/C(t) = β Ω/(h + Ω). Thus, ∂ [β [C(t) −
c(t, t)]/C(t)]/∂ β = Ω/(h + Ω) > 0. A rise in β increases the difference be-
tween aggregate and individual consumption growth rates. |
Property (v): ∂ [C(t)−c(t, t)]/∂ Ω = [ζ(t)−γ (1−σ−1) gx(t)] > 0. This prop-
erty reflects the fact that 0 = a(t, t) falls the more short of average wealth the
higher is aggregate (average) wealth Ω(t). As consumption is proportional
to wealth, c(t, t) falls the more short of average consumption the higher is
aggregate (average) wealth. ‖
A.2 Equation (22) and Consumption Growth. The current value Hamilto-
nian is given by:
Hc =
C(τ)1−σX(τ)−γ(1−σ)
1−σ e
ρ t + µK(r˜ K(τ)− C(τ)) + µX(ϕ (C(τ)−X(τ))).
Equation (22) follows from:
∂ Hc/∂ C(τ) = 0 , ∂ Hc/∂ X(τ) = 0 ,
− ∂ Hc/∂ K(τ) = µ˙K(τ)− ρ µK(τ) , −∂ Hc/∂ X(τ) = µ˙X(τ)− ρ µX(τ) .
35
Furthermore, differentiating (21) with respect to time implies:
c˙(τ − y, τ)
c(τ − y, τ) = −
λ˙(τ)
λ(τ)σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
X˙(τ)
X(τ)
.
Considering the Lagrangian from (18), we observe that λ(τ) = VC [C(τ), X(τ)],
thus,
− λ˙(τ)
λ(τ)σ
=
C˙(τ)
C(τ)
− γ σ − 1
σ
X˙(τ)
X(τ)
.
Individual consumption growth is then given by:
c˙(τ − y, τ)
c(τ − y, τ) =
r˜ − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
X˙(τ)
X(τ)
− γ
σ
χ˙(τ) (1− γ χ(τ))−1 ,
which coincides with the rate of aggregate consumption growth. ‖
A.3 Summary of the Social Optimum.28 We represent aggregate behavior
by a series of differential equations in the variables κ(t), and χ(t):29
C˙(t)
C(t)
=
r˜ − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
X˙(t)
X(t)
− γ
σ
χ˙(t) (1− γ χ(t))−1 ,
X˙(t)
X(t)
= ϕ(χ(t)− 1) ,
K˙(t)
K(t)
= r˜ − χ(t)
κ(t)
.
A.4 Impact of the Externality on Levels. Claim. In an economy with inelas-
tic labor supply and without a production externality, the stronger is the
consumption externality the higher are χ and κ, the lower is χ/κ, and the
28The appropriate transversality conditions are: limτ→∞ e−ρ τ µK(τ)K(τ) = 0,
limτ→∞ e−ρ τ µX(τ)X(τ) = 0, and K(t), X(t) given.
29As in the decentralized economy, the dynamics of the model is two-dimensional: χ˙ =
χ˙(χ), κ˙ = κ˙(χ, κ). The dimension of the stable manifold is one, and the system is saddle
point stable.
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stronger is the distortion with respect to χ and κ.
Proof. Clearly, for both the market and the planner’s economies χ =
1+g/ϕ. Also, for both economies, κ = (g+ϕ)/(ϕ(r˜−g)). Finally, χ/κ = r˜−g.
χ˜/κ < χ/κ⇔ g˜ > g∗. The last part of the Lemma follows from the fact that
∂ (g˜ − g∗)/∂ γ > 0. ‖
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1. By a first order Taylor series approximation,
g∗(α) ≈ g∗(1) + ∂ g
∗(1)
∂ r
∂ r
∂ α
(α− 1) .
For 0 < α ≤ 1, g∗(α) − g∗(1) ≈ A (α − 1)/σ˜ ≤ 0. Thus, a decrease in α
lowers g∗ while it leaves g˜ unaffected.
Step 2. For the second part of the Proposition, consider α = 1. Then
∂ (g˜ − g∗)/∂ γ = (σ − 1)(g˜ − g∗)/σ˜ > 0. This distortionary effect of γ is
strengthened by an increase in the production externality, that is, by a de-
crease in α: −∂ /∂ α [∂ (g˜ − g∗)/∂ γ] = (σ − 1)A/σ˜2 > 0. ‖
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4. In the proof, we use the following two relations.
u(c,X)|c=C = V (C,X), and as β = 0, c(v, t) = c(v′, t) = C(t).
The optimal and market consumption growth rates are equal if and only if
θ˜(v, t) = θ∗(v, t), for all t along the transitional paths, where:
θ∗(v, t) ≡ − uc(v, t)(
ucc(v, t) + ucX(v, t)
X˙(t)
c˙(v,t)
)
c(v, t)
,
θ˜(v, t) ≡ − VC(t) + VX(t)(
VCC(t) + VCX(t) +
X˙(t)
C˙(t)
(VCX(t) + VXX(t))
)
C(t)
.
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Using u(c,X)|c=C = V (C,X), c(v, t) = C(t), and suppressing time indexes,
equality of individual consumption growth rates requires:
VC(
VCC + VCX
X˙
C˙
) = VC + VX(
VCC + VCX +
X˙
C˙
(VCX + VXX)
) . (A.1)
Condition (29) is equivalent to: (VC V˙X−VX V˙C) = 0. Clearly, condition (29)
implies (A.1). If ϕ→∞, X = C, condition (29) holds, and so does (A.1). If
ϕ <∞, condition (29) does not hold for our CRRA utility function (as long
as γ > 0). Therefore, (A.1) does not hold as well. ‖
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5. The individual consumption growth rates are
defined by:
g˜c =
r − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
g˜X − γ
σ
χ˙ (1− γ χ)−1 , (A.2)
g∗c =
r − ρ
σ
+ γ
σ − 1
σ
g∗X . (A.3)
If ϕ → ∞, X = C, and χ˙ = 0. In this case, the consumption externality
stems from gC rather than gX . Regardless of β, g˜C = g˜c. If β = 0, g
∗
c =
g∗C . In this case, g˜c = g˜C = g
∗
C = g
∗
c , and the consumption externality
is non-distortionary. If, however, β > 0, g∗C < g
∗
c by the intergenerational
turnover effect. Suppose that at t = 0, g˜c(0) = g
∗
c (0). Then g˜C(0) = g˜c(0) =
g∗c (0) > g
∗
C(0). At t = 0 + ∆ = ∆, for some small ∆ > 0, g˜c(∆) > g
∗
c (∆).
The individual growth rates start to deviate, as g˜C(∆) > g
∗
C(∆) due to the
intergenerational turnover effect.
If ϕ <∞, the same effect, depending on the magnitude of β, holds (with
X in place of C). In addition, χ˙ 6= 0. If χ˙ > 0, g˜c is lowered (internalization
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effect). Equations (A.2) and (A.2) show that both the magnitude of χ˙ and
that of β determine the sign of [g˜c(t)− g∗c (t)]. ‖
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Figure 1: Finite lifetimes – a rise in β
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